Constructivism and constitutionism by Just, Sine Nørholm & Nørgaard, Jens Lautrup
 
 Fakultetet for Sprog, Kommunikation 
og Kultur 
Handelshøjskolen i København 
Dalgas Have 15 
2000 Frederiksberg 
nr. 7/2004 
 
 
 
 
Sine Nørholm Just &  
Jens Lautrup Nørgaard,  
Centre for Communication Studies, CBS 
 
 
 
It is all in the word: 
Constructivism and constitutionism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sine Nørholm Just and Jens Lautrup Nørgaard                                                                - 2 - 
It is all in the word: construction and constitution 
Constructivism is one of the most successful paradigms within the 
social and human sciences at the beginning of the new millennium. 
But it is a very disputed paradigm, and critical accounts of this domi-
nating –ism are proliferating. Recently, the critics have become 
more visible, and the paradigm is now challenged seriously. Being 
critics of constructivism ourselves we welcome this tendency. How-
ever, we are also critical of the critique since it tends to dichotomise 
the debate to an unnecessary degree, and, at times, does not admit 
the very fertile insights that are also part of the constructivist ap-
proach. In the following we shall join the critique, but in doing so we 
will point towards a moderated view of the ways in which the world 
becomes meaningful to us. Our aim is to sketch out a theoretical 
perspective that benefits from both the insights of constructivism and 
its critics, and thereby is able to realise the full explanatory potential 
of both. 
 
1. Introductory considerations about (social) construc-
tivism 
Reality is socially constructed, as Peter Berger and Thomas Luck-
mann famously said (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1991). This proposi-
tion is common knowledge for social constructivists and construc-
tionists of all hues;1 as they see it, our understanding of the world 
cannot be separated from the contexts and processes in and 
through which it is perceived. In a manner of speaking, the world is 
reduced to the social context and cognitive process of the observer. 
At the theoretical level, constructivism sees itself as presenting an 
alternative to the positivist theory of knowledge with its ideal of sci-
entific objectivity (Gergen, 2001, p. 7). Taking this insight as the 
starting point for scientific investigations has a number of conse-
quences: most notably, constructivists focus on the processes of so-
cial interaction whereby the understanding of a certain phenomenon 
comes about and leave aside the question of what the phenomenon 
‘really’ looks like.  
                                      
1 Although some scholars attempt to distinguish between constructivism and constructionism 
and see them as two separate modes of studying social construction (Burr, 1995, p. 2) no clear 
demarcation has been achieved, and the two terms are often used interchangeably, even syn-
onymously (Lynch, 1998, n. 12). In the following we shall refer to (social) constructivism, as the 
use of this term seems to be on the rise (Andersen, 2001, p. 101).  
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While constructivists take for granted that the human understanding 
of the world is never given, it is a matter of dispute how deep the 
construction goes. That is, social constructivists disagree as to 
whether it is only the human understanding of the phenomena or 
also the phenomena themselves that are constructed, and they di-
verge on what consequences the constructivist stance should have 
for research. First, all constructivists agree that inherently social 
phenomena such as money or art are constructed, but not all would 
concede that objects of the physical world such as gravity or biologi-
cal sex are social constructs as well (Hacking, 1999, pp. 24-25). 
Second, all constructivist research aspires to show that the phe-
nomenon under study, or at least our understanding of it depending 
on the type of studied phenomenon and the radicality of the re-
searcher, is contingent. That is, the phenomenon needs not exist in 
its present form or, perhaps, exist at all. Some constructivists then 
go on to claim that the phenomenon is bad or wrong as it is and to 
suggest ways of doing away with or changing it (Hacking, 1999, p. 
6).  
 
In the following we shall concentrate on the presuppositions, argu-
ments, and consequences that are common to social constructivism. 
We focus attention at the level of theoretical foundations and inves-
tigate the benefits and limitations of the constructivist perspective. 
One characteristic feature of the constructivist view is that it neglects 
that which is given to our senses and does not explain how the en-
counter of sensory stimuli and cognition constitutes meaning. We 
argue that constructivism thereby makes the contradictory claim that 
the importance of the outer world is, at best, secondary to the social 
sphere in which meaning is constructed. Contrary to this position we 
claim that without the reality of the outer world there would be no 
sociality, only self-absorbed, tautological perdition. Having substan-
tiated this argument about the ontological weakness of constructiv-
ism we shall present an alternative approach, constitutionism, which 
we believe retains the explanatory potential of constructivism while 
avoiding its inherent disadvantages. By installing constitutionism as 
the fundamental theoretical perspective, the concept of constructiv-
ism may also be preserved and reserved for the practical and ana-
lytical functions we believe it performs well.  
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2. A false alternative: constructivism versus essential-
ism 
At the core of the constructivist program are the claims that objective 
knowledge is unattainable and that no phenomena are naturally 
given, at least not to our meaningful recognition. Thus, social con-
structivism is contrasted both with the positivist goal of achieving 
certain knowledge and with the essentialist ambition of discovering 
what lies behind the appearance of a phenomenon. However, in a 
number of ways social constructivists actually reproduce positivistic 
and essentialistic notions of the world and our being in it instead of 
presenting alternatives to it.  
 
First, the claim that something is socially constructed is as absolute 
as the proposition that it is objectively given, and, thus, is quite es-
sentialistic in its very denial of essence (Kjørup, 2001, p. 13). That 
is, the statement about the constructed nature of (social) phenom-
ena must be substantiated if it is to represent a viable alternative to 
objectivism; its correctness cannot simply be assumed, as many 
constructivists tend to do. Second, constructivists do not present any 
alternative to the positivistic ideal of discovering truths that exist in-
dependently of our representations of them, wherefore this ideal is 
conserved in the rejection of its attainability (Kjørup, 2001, p. 16). 
Again, constructivists must argue their case positively if an alterna-
tive to the rejected position is to arise; as it stands, constructivists 
must return to existing norms of falsifiability and reproducibility when 
looking for standards with which to judge their own truth claims. 
 
Third, both reproductions of the positions that constructivism claims 
to counter result from the insistence that we are dealing with exclu-
sive alternatives of either/or instead of inclusive positions of 
both/and. Dichotomous thinking is in itself a strong and seemingly 
convincing way of conceptualising the world, be that the world of 
science or that of daily life. As Richard J. Bernstein points out: 
 
 “From a manifest perspective, many contemporary debates 
are still structured within traditional extremes. There is still 
an underlying belief that in the final analysis the only viable 
alternatives open to us are either some form of objectivism, 
foundationalism, ultimate grounding of knowledge, science, 
Sine Nørholm Just and Jens Lautrup Nørgaard                                                                - 5 - 
It is all in the word: construction and constitution 
philosophy, and language or that we are ineluctably led to 
relativism, scepticism, historicism, and nihilism” (Bernstein 
1983: 2). 
 
Social constructivists operate within the same basic thought pattern 
as do essentialistic positivists. Adherents to both positions concede 
that phenomena are either given or contingent, nominal or essential, 
and the list of exclusive alternatives continues: phenomena and the 
experience of them are either natural or social, agential or structural, 
individual or collective (Powell, 2001, pp. 302-303). Ultimately, these 
exclusive dichotomies mean that constructivists, having rejected one 
term of an oppositional pair, are stranded with the second and 
equally criticizable option.  
 
The basic problem, which we shall explore in the following, is that 
constructivism by pitting itself against essentialism both creates and 
becomes a false alternative. We shall first look into the unfortunate 
implications of the exclusive stance, and then seek to explain con-
structivism’s reliance on the dichotomous and in our opinion re-
stricted explanatory mode through an examination of the limitations 
we believe are embedded in the constructivist terminology.  
3. Unfortunate implications of ‘construction’ 
The constructivist focus on how human knowledge is formed fosters 
two main points of critique and debate: allegations of idealism, for 
one, and, secondly, accusations of relativism. Even though the cri-
tique of constructivism at times becomes rather one-dimensional, we 
find that the charges of idealism and relativism are generally sub-
stantiated.2 
3.1 Idealism 
While realism and idealism are presented as each other’s opposites, 
constructivists, contrary to their usual practice, acknowledge that the 
two terms form the extremes of a scale, and most constructivists ex-
plicitly position themselves near the middle of the scale rather than 
at the extreme ends. Thus, most constructivists avoid the trap of 
posing idealism as the false alternative to realism, and the problem-
                                      
2 There is intense awareness of these problematic aspects on both sides of the debate-line, see 
for instance Parker (1998), Bredsdorff (2002), Kjørup (2001), Hacking (1999). 
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atic position that nothing is real, which in reality amounts to much 
the same as claiming that everything is real, is only held by a few 
(extravagantly radical) members of the field.3 However, the distinc-
tion between the natural and the social is rigorously maintained and 
provides the foundation for the constructivists’ division of the world 
into the given and the constructed.  
 
The existence of physical reality is usually not questioned, but the 
human perception of it always is. Thus, the great majority of con-
structivists would concede that the earth has a certain shape regard-
less of the form we attribute to it, but they do not think it possible to 
determine that shape independently of the processes of language-
borne culturation. Very often constructivists conclude from this de-
pendency on cultural forms that humans are unable to perceive any-
thing but these very forms. In short, the earth might very well have a 
particular shape regardless of our attributions, but we shall never be 
able to perceive it. Consequently, the physicality of the earth, alleg-
edly, is of no interest, and we should even restrict ourselves from 
holding any opinions on the matter.  
 
Arguing that the resulting believes all too often obliterate the proc-
esses by which they come about, constructivist researchers seek to 
draw attention to and explain these social and creative processes. 
Since constructivists contend that we cannot expect any truthful in-
sight through the perception of the given, wrapped as we are in our 
cultural contingency, they believe we must search for the truth in this 
very culture – and they find the road to truth in deconstruction. They 
conclude that it is by means of the deconstruction of culturally de-
termined cognitive structures that we reach or – at the very least – 
aim at reaching the pure and irreducible ideas. 
 
Whereas social constructivists give the world of nature and physical 
objects a special status – they exist prior to their construction, so to 
say – they believe that other phenomena belong exclusively to the 
realm of social reality. The broad categories of cultural practices and 
political institutions present themselves as examples of such thor-
                                      
3 Jean Baudrillard’s postmodernist denial of the existence of reality with its corresponding cele-
bration of the simulacrum, the simulation of the real, exemplifies this position (Best & Kellner, 
1991, p. 139).  
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oughly social phenomena, and although these do have physical 
manifestations – theatre buildings and parliaments – they can be 
studied as social constructs without remainder. In this sense, social 
phenomena gain their very reality in and through their creation, and 
even when there is a material base to the processes of social con-
struction the study of these processes is valid and worthwhile in its 
own right.  
 
The charge of idealism, then, can be overcome by pointing out that 
social construction is a prerequisite for the existence of the human 
world, and that the analytical tool of deconstruction is well suited to 
explaining the processes through which the culturally contingent 
structures we usually call reality are erected.  
3.2 Relativism 
The charge of relativism, as we see it, is potentially more damaging 
to the constructivist position than is the accusation of idealism. Con-
structivists assert, and rightly so, that such phenomena as social 
norms and political practices are conditioned by the circumstances 
in which they arise, take on various shapes in different contexts, and 
can be altered within the specific contexts in which they arise. Thus, 
the objectivist longing for a certain and eternal truth is discarded, 
especially if that means one universal truth. However, leaving cer-
tainty behind does not necessarily lead to relativism, and most con-
structivists have sought to tackle the weaknesses of the relativist 
stance, but none have been able to overcome them altogether. For 
some constructivists the sensitivity to the dynamic and contextual 
character of knowledge has fostered a naive cherishing of all norms 
and practices as being good in their context, while others have come 
to harbour a constant suspicion that no society is ever good enough.  
 
‘Multiculturalism,’ a popular approach to intercultural encounters in 
the face of the plurality of norms and values, provides an apt exam-
ple of the first constructivist option and its limitations.4 Zygmunt 
Bauman presents the problem pointedly:  
 
“…the invocation of ‘multiculturalism’ when made by the 
learned classes […] means: Sorry, we cannot bail you out 
                                      
4 For a more thorough presentation and critique of multiculturalism see Just (2004). 
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of the mess you are in. Yes, there is confusion about val-
ues, about the meaning of ‘being human’, about the right 
ways of living together; but it is up to you to sort it out in 
your own fashion and bear the consequences in the event 
that you are not happy with the results. Yes, there is a ca-
cophony of voices and no tune is likely to be sung in uni-
son, but do not worry: no tune is necessarily better than the 
next, and if it were there wouldn’t at any rate be a way of 
knowing it” (Bauman, 2001, p. 124). 
 
Thus, some constructivists claim that no one is able to understand 
norms and practices that originate in contexts other than their own, 
and thereby abandon questions of truth and right. The idea is that 
even though a certain practice may look utterly despicable from my 
place of perception, it may be perfectly acceptable in another con-
text, and I am in no position to know. This sort of relativism not only 
disallows engagement and learning between differently situated in-
dividuals, but also has the slightly ironic twist of making each posi-
tion anything but relative to its occupants. If we are not able to come 
to an understanding of any other positions than our own, how are we 
ever to learn that some of our current practices and beliefs may be 
less than perfect, and how are we going to be able to change them? 
If we are unable to distance ourselves from the contexts in which we 
live and learn, how are we to know that these contexts are con-
structed and contingent rather than given and necessary?  
 
The mutual intentionality of interaction must be reciprocated in order 
to be performed. From an ethical standpoint this is where the multi-
cultural relativism fails. In its rejection of an ethnocentric necessity it 
denies ’the other’s’ truth claim. This means, firstly, that ‘the other’s’ 
truth is localised and ultimately becomes irrelevant to ’the I’ since it 
has its own equally valid localised truth. Secondly, the idealisation of 
‘the other’s’ right to an inviolable local truth may lead to a negligence 
of ‘the I’s’ truth claim, which weakens reciprocity. ‘The other’ and 
‘the I’ are not bound to relate to each other, and thereby the relativist 
position harbours the very asymmetry between different subject po-
sitions that it set out to avoid. The position of extreme contextualism 
contradicts the theoretical foundations of social constructivism and 
undermines the very possibility of constructivist research. 
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The second possible constructivist take on relativism seeks to avoid 
the weaknesses of the first by focusing on the shortcomings of exist-
ing situations and emphasising how things could be different. Many 
modes of discourse analysis and particularly the influential approach 
known as critical discourse analysis (CDA) exemplify this suspicious 
constructivism. While not all constructivists are discourse analysts, 
language certainly plays a central role in the social construction of 
reality, and all forms of discourse analysis take this and other social 
constructivist insights as their starting point (Bredsdorff, 2002, p. 
89).  
 
In CDA the constructivist foundation is formulated as an interde-
pendent relationship between the social world and our talk about it. 
“…Discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it 
constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities 
of and relationships between people and groups of people” (Fair-
clough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258). When studying the relationship be-
tween discursive action and social structures (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 
9) CDA tends to focus on the dark side of discourse. The purpose is 
to highlight discursive features that usually pass unnoticed but con-
tribute significantly to the creation of social reality. Moreover, it is 
commonly accepted that the dominant discourses are usually bad; 
CDA reveals oppressions and inequalities embedded in the way we 
discursively construct our society (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, 
pp. 4-6).  
  
CDA seeks to avoid the weaknesses of relativism by focusing on the 
relationship between discourse and society and emphasising how 
discourses may hide or even excuse social injustices. That is, CDA 
aims to explain the communicative construction of the social world 
and to criticise the forms and contents we usually take for granted. 
Thereby, CDA becomes able to pass critical judgement on current 
assumptions and to create possibilities for change, but in doing so it 
also betrays its own foundational insight that discourse is socially 
constitutive as well as constituted. In order to perform its critique 
CDA must operate with a notion of what is ‘really’ going on behind 
the discourse and grant itself a privileged position. Thus, CDA must 
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operate with a distinction between the discursive expression of the 
social order and society as it actually is.  
 
In order to perform its critical function CDA must deny its own theo-
retical starting point and reinstall a category of objective reality 
against which the discursive constructions of society may be tested. 
However, if the idea that social reality is discursively constituted as 
well as constitutive of discourse were to be taken seriously, there 
would be no way of circumventing the mutually constitutive dimen-
sions of discourse and society. There would be no recourse to a 
truer understanding of the present social order with which the pre-
dominant discursive constructions could be compared, and there 
would be no way of generating change except from within the cur-
rent situation and with the presently available discursive means.  
 
In its eagerness to avoid the charges of relativity and to endow its 
normative position with critical bite, CDA risks belying its theoretical 
foundation in the constitutive nature of discourse that in our opinion 
is its greatest asset. Thereby, CDA displays the weakness that is 
inherent to the choice of a constructivist perspective; even if there 
are occasional references to interdependent constitution, the di-
chotomous understanding of things as being either constructed or 
given, and of people as being either active or passive saturate the 
reasoning. The very terminology of social constructivism prevents its 
adherents from releasing the full explanatory potential of the per-
spective.  
 
4. Problem: terminology 
A main argument of this working paper is that some of the major 
confusions concerning the constructivist paradigm are due to the 
lack of conceptual distinction between the two terms ‘construction’ 
and ‘constitution’. It is our claim that much of what goes under the 
name of construction should rightly be termed constitution. Certainly, 
both terms are employed by constructivists, but it seems very un-
clear whether they refer to different phenomena or if the terms are 
used randomly representing more or less the same things.5 
                                      
5 The examples are abundant. We mention but a few: Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Burr, 1998; 
Putnam & Cooren 2004; Ainsworth & Hardy, 2004. 
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The very use of the term ‘construction’ partially accounts for the 
weaknesses of the constructivist stance. The concept of construc-
tion implies the idea of engineering. Even though one cannot con-
struct anything out of nothing the idea is still that of a material, which 
lends itself to the constructing actor as a virginal, uninterested and 
unconditional resource to be built up according to the imagination of 
the actor. Construction, in other words, leaves the actor with the 
whole initiative; he or she is the inventive, creative, active and 
autonomous part working with an inactive and defenceless material.  
 
These implications of the constructivist terminology are, however, at 
odds with the constructivistic claim that the actor is constrained by 
the social contexts in which he or she acts. When employing the 
language of construction constructivists actually create a different 
meaning than they claim to intend. While constructivists claim to pay 
equal attention to the roles of actors and structures and to view peo-
ple as both constructive and constructed, their formulation of the po-
sition does not allow them to focus on both issues at once. Either 
the actor constructs society or society constructs the actor; there is 
no room for interaction between the categories, no way of articulat-
ing their mutual constitution.  
 
 
5. Constitution as a phenomenological-hermeneutic 
approach 
The concept of constitution as we fragmentarily outline it in the fol-
lowing is inspired by hermeneutics and, as a consequence, also 
draws on phenomenological ideas. Constitutionism, in our opinion, is 
an approach to meaningful being that does not present an alterna-
tive, but a corrective to generally held assumptions of the construc-
tivist paradigm. There is a basic lexical distinction between the con-
cepts of construction and constitution, and we advocate that apply-
ing this difference to the epistemological categories of constructiv-
ism and constitutionism will enrich the paradigm that is now labelled  
(social) constructivism. 
 
5.1 Truth and language 
The problem of construction is, in its essence, a problem of rational-
ity, which means that it is concerned with the quality of the scientific 
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truth claims one can make about the world. As such the constructiv-
ist paradigm is part of an ongoing debate in the social and human 
sciences. In The Contingency of Language Richard Rorty (1995), on 
the basis of the idea that truth is neither found nor made, argues be-
yond the either-or of the objectivism-relativism dichotomy. Truth, he 
states, is not to be found ‘out there’ in the world; it does not lie there 
waiting to be discovered. With Rorty in mind, we can argue the im-
possibility of evaluating the truth quality of our understanding by its 
representational accuracy. The only accurate representation of the 
world is the world itself but this statement, despite its logical undeni-
ability, makes no sense. The unmediated form of world relation – or 
being-in-the-world if one likes – is only found outside the realm of 
language and therefore outside the sphere of the meaningful. “Being 
that can be understood is language” as Gadamer says in one of his 
most famous aphorisms (Gadamer 1989).  
 
Sometimes this Gadamerian statement is mistakenly taken to mean 
that being as such is language, but this, obviously, is not the point. 
The point is that being insofar as it is meaningful – what can be un-
derstood is that which makes sense, that which provides meaning – 
is being in language. The sentence does not deny the existence of 
non-linguistic being, nor does it discard the possibility of a world in-
dependent of humans; it only refers to a reflection on human mean-
ingful being. Being in language is being in which the world is medi-
ated6 through the abstractions of metaphoric symbolism: meaningful 
life through metaphor as Paul Ricoeur would say (Ricoeur 1975). 
Consequently, the world cannot be perceived ’accurately’ in the ob-
jectivistic one-to-one-relational sense. The unmediated being in 
which we find accuracy is possible only when the world represents 
itself, but in that case we must resign from meaningful reflection on 
that which is represented. 
 
Hence, we adhere to Rorty’s claim that “only sentences can be true, 
and that human beings make truths by making language in which to 
                                      
6 For the sake of argument we use the term of mediation here in spite of Rorty’s explicit critique 
of the idea that language should be conceptualised as a medium, which connects the two intrin-
sic natures of the world ‘out there’ and the self ‘in here’.  Most probably it would be more appro-
priate to see both the world ‘out there’,the self ‘in here,’ and language as instances of human 
being. 
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phrase sentences”, but discarding the representational truth criteria 
does not lead to constructivism: 
 
“ … (T)he idealists confused the idea that nothing has such 
a nature with the idea that space and time are unreal, that 
human beings cause the spatiotemporal world to exist. We 
need to make a distinction between the claim that the world 
is out there and the claim that truth is out there. To say that 
the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, 
with common sense, that most things in space and time are 
the effects of causes which do not include human mental 
states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say 
that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that 
sentences are elements of human languages, and that 
human languages are human creations” (Rorty 1995: 108-
9). 
 
This statement, of course, begs the question of the qualities of the 
relation between world and language. The constitution of meaning 
takes place in a dialectical dynamic between the sensory appear-
ances of the world and the elastic adaptability of the symbolic forms. 
We do not hereby maintain that the symbols, in a manner of speak-
ing, wrap themselves around the appearing phenomena resulting in 
a mere print of them – that would bring us back to the representa-
tional truth. On the one hand, symbolic forms are socio-culturally 
and historically conditioned and characterised by an active and 
shaping adaptability. On the other hand, the symbolic forms are still 
directed towards an object – the appearing world – which always 
orientates the shaping. The practice of using symbolic forms is i
tentional and therefore directed and biased, but nevertheless moti-
vated and guided by the spatio-temporal immediacy. Even the most 
subtle and sophisticated form has a relation to the world; the consti-
tution of meaning is contingent in the sense that the specific form is 
possible, but not necessary. Contingency, thus, is not random, since 
what is possible is limited both by the appearances of the world and 
by the socio-cultural specificity of the symbolic forms.  
n-
 
The constructivist social pessimism – the relativistic idea that mean-
ing is only understandable within specific language games and con-
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sequently unreachable from other language games – seems to stem 
from the conviction that man is trapped in language. Since lan-
guage, logically, can only make reference to language, man’s life 
can only consist of the logical structures of language. Once a person 
is introduced to one language game he or she is determined by it 
and not only out of reach of the non-linguistic, but also out of reach 
of the ‘other’ linguistic. But as Geertz put it, some 30 years ago, 
“man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has 
spun.” This insight is the pivotal correction to the language-logic-
trap: the logical structure of language does not produce significance 
in itself; it is not until the structure meets the given in immediacy that 
meaning is produced. Language without a semantic dimension does 
not make sense, so to speak. So human beings are un-trapped by 
language, since it is through language that the world becomes 
meaningful and opens itself to us.  
 
The deconstructivist position gives the impression of an attempt to 
break free of the bonds of language by demonstrating the limitations 
of language. While this, for obvious reasons, takes place in lan-
guage, it can be characterised as using language against language. 
The consequence is infinite regress. Language must be seen as a 
game, a game that we both need and cannot escape. Nevertheless 
we can overcome the determination of language, and indeed we do 
all the time in the very use of it. Of course this is also what the de-
constructivist position does, but at the same time it defends a dead 
alley ideology that is hostile towards its own medium. One must sur-
render to the game and play, and it is in playing that creativity opens 
the world to us. But at the same time we must admit that this creativ-
ity was given to us in the first place by/in language. 
 
Truth, then, is the consistent understanding of something. What 
gives a given understanding consistency is its appropriateness as 
being in the world within the framework of a specific language tool. 
This hermeneutic conception underlines the interdependence of 
truth, the understanding subject and the understood: “Es ist für die 
Wahrheit des Verstehens konstitutiv, dass der Verstehende zu dem 
gehört, was er versteht” (Grondin 2001: 71).  The Heideggerian ter-
minology of ‘Geworfenheit’ forms the backdrop of this statement, 
and one must keep in mind the underlying point of thrownness into 
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something in order to avoid the relativistic idea of self-absorbing lin-
guistic structures able to construct their own truths independently of 
the world.  On the contrary, the hermeneutic truth advocated here 
with strong allusions to Heidegger and Gadamer The constitutionist 
understands truth as the uncovering of something. As a product of 
intentionality, the discovery is a constitutive structuration of the ma-
terial, which lends itself as object for our uncovering activities, and 
this material will always be partially resistant to the structuration.  
Thus, experiencing truth, in a matter of speaking, is experiencing the 
sensation of being familiar with a certain meaning. In a sense, truth 
is when language transcends itself and makes us feel at home in the 
world. We apply meaning in the Gadamerian sense (Gadamer 1989) 
incorporating it into our immediate situation and acting accordingly 
(Nørgaard 2002). Incorporating in this context means appropriating:  
 
“(T)o understand is not to project oneself into the text; it is 
to receive an enlarged self from the apprehension of pro-
posed worlds which are the genuine object of interpretation 
(…) Thus appropriation ceases to appear as a kind of pos-
session, as a way of taking hold of (…) It implies instead a 
moment of dispossession of the narcissistic ego” (Ricoeur 
1981: 182-93). 
 
We could consider the symbolic forms, the signs, as constructed en-
tities, but in coherence with Rorty’s claims we must emphasise that 
the fact that language is a construction does not mean the world is 
constructed too.  And, more importantly, it does not make our mean-
ingful symbolic representations a construction in their relation to this 
world. As system language may be compared to the castles we 
make out of sand on the beach during summer; both the significance 
given in language and that given in the sandcastle constitutes our 
relation to the world. We might not have any entrance to the world – 
insofar as the world is meaningful – except that of linguistic con-
struction, but the relation between world and language is one of 
constitution, not construction. Using a common metaphor we can 
say that even though we perceive the world through our historically 
and culturally conditioned lenses, the world as such is not the 
lenses, it takes form through them. The lenses do not construct form 
out of nothing; there must be sensory impression of the world to 
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provide elements for the form, and as such the very perceiving itself 
bears witness to the existence and dynamics of the world. 
 
The relation between the world and the language game could be 
characterised as a constant insistence by the world if it were not for 
the possible assumption that the world generally is intentional, which 
we would not claim. Nevertheless, the world is always there as a 
correctional factor regarding our language game, whereby language 
is dynamised and continually restructured. Language, then, does not 
result in some kind of alienation. It does not move us out of or away 
from the world, quite the opposite. It follows that language is not ar-
bitrary, it is contingent as stated by Rorty. Unfortunately, we cannot 
prove the arbitrarity of language wrong, since the necessary evi-
dence will be lost in pre-history. How did the cow come about being 
labelled ‘cow’? Contemporary dynamics and changes in language 
show  that such movements are always in one way or another moti-
vated by what they refer to and not only a function of the system, 
e.g. the ‘langue’, to which they pertain. Language and truth consti-
tute each other as that which can meaningfully be said about the 
world. 
 
6. Constitution as a moderation of constructivism (and 
as mediator in the false alternative) 
Constructivism, in its broadest sense, has contributed with very 
valuable insight about the hermeneutic fact that “worldviews do not 
merely duplicate reality as it is in itself, but are instead pragmatic in-
terpretations embraced by our language-world” (Grondin 1994: 18). 
Moreover, constructivism has sharpened scientific practices and 
methodologies with a wide range of research designs, regarding 
empirical analysis as well as abstraction. Still, constructivism is far 
from being a uniform approach to the study of the social and mean-
ing, and as a paradigmatic program its character is more that of an 
attempt to present an ontological premise than an epistemological 
consideration. We see this glide from epistemology to ontology as 
the prime cause for critique, and we see it as the reason why con-
structivism should be modified through the introduction of constitu-
tionism as its theoretical abstraction. We consider the problematic 
gliding to be a consequence of an unawareness of the lexical speci-
ficities of ‘construction’ and ‘constitution.’ It is this blurring of con-
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cepts that we have aimed at overcoming in drawing on key-insights 
from philosophical hermeneutics. 
 
Human beings are, as inherent parts of their daily lives and routines, 
constructive. This we could call the intuitive instrumental being, 
which relates not only to the physical world, but also to the mental. 
The experience of being constructive, nevertheless, presupposes 
interpretation and understanding, a specific world constitution. The 
problem with provocation of the concept of construction lies in its hi-
postasization: when construction as an explanatory aspect of human 
cognition and being becomes paradigmatic the concept is stretched 
further than it reaches. It is in the transmission of the logic of instru-
mental construction that the erroneous move is made.7  
 
However, we cannot entirely substitute constitution for construction. 
While constitutionism as a philosophical implication might be rela-
tively convincing it is difficult and complex to methodize. The con-
cept of construction has the seducing feature that it is easier to 
make analytically operative than constitution. When we apply con-
struction in the analytical approach, what we do is to deconstruct. 
The construction is necessarily something created, e.g. something 
constructed, which in our perspective is something ‘accumulated’ by 
someone, and the analysis, consequently, must be the opposite; 
that is,  an attempt to decompose or to part. This is, in principle, a 
straightforward process during which the analysed elements be-
come increasingly fragmented, and in spite of its never-ending char-
acter this work has practical advantages.8 The concept of constitu-
tion does not offer this straightforwardness. A constitution, form or 
shape, is not basically a construct, it is an appearance, and it is not 
an intrinsic quality of the appearance that it can be dissolved in its 
basic elements. Naturally, we can choose, analytically, to describe 
the form as being composed by a number of characteristics, but it is 
not in the nature of form to be composed. While the approach to 
construction is dissection, the approach to constitution is partaking; 
to grasp the form one must let oneself be grasped by it, and that, of 
course, requires a bigger investment than distanced deconstruction. 
                                      
7 Language’s obvious lacking ability to perform any absolute notion about the given motivates 
constructivism to turn its back on the world; constructivists make a virtue out of necessity and 
detach language from external reality. 
8 Admittedly, this is extremely put, and naturally the description can only be justified in principle. 
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Although this poses a great analytical challenge, we believe that the 
relativist weaknesses of the constructivist stance can be avoided 
without hampering the basic insight that human understanding is a 
contextually bound social process from which there is no escape. 
Such a strong theoretical position must accept the contextually con-
strained nature of all human interactions as its starting point. We are 
beings of space and time always facing each other and the world in 
the concrete here and now, but while the context limits our actions it 
is also what enables us to act in the first place. Without limitations 
there would be no possibilities; human action is facilitated by the 
prior existence of structures and frameworks, norms and expecta-
tions that give us guidance on what to do and how to do it. Only by 
means of our preceding understanding can we make sense of the 
specific situations in which we must act, and it is only when the 
situation has become meaningful that it is possible to act in ways 
that may change our world.  
 
Social realities are continually constituted by the sense people make 
of them, and the processes of meaning formation are in turn consti-
tuted by structures and expectations that exist prior to the specific 
interaction. Social constitution contains its own dynamic whereby 
change becomes possible as a consequence of existing understand-
ings. Our situatedness is what allows us to move beyond existing 
horizons; we are enabled by our limits. And it is in the idea of situat-
edness that we find one of the meeting points between the con-
structed and the constituted. We are situated not only in relation to 
our historico-cultural tradition and language game, but also in rela-
tion to the immediately given. This is where we should look for the 
intersubjectively experienced world and the possibility of encounter-
ing the ‘other’ language game. 
 
The understanding of the interdependence of limits and possibilities 
provides a correction to the constructivist approach; this understand-
ing is the foundation of the perspective we propose to label constitu-
tionism. The constitutionist position is based on the claim that the 
world and our being in it only become meaningful through processes 
of social interaction. Furthermore, constitutionism focuses on the 
continual production and reproduction of meaning based on guide-
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lines and norms that exist prior to any given interaction, but are only 
articulated in concrete interactions. Continual meaning formation is 
the process that constitutes our social reality; such meaning forma-
tion is, of course, connected to phenomena that are not purely 
communicative, but these phenomena only become meaningful 
through communicative interaction.  
 
7. Outroduction 
The world is not socially constructed; our understanding of the world 
arises from our experience of it, and our experience of the world be-
comes meaningful through our communicative interaction in it. 
Meaning is constituted in and through language, but the phenomena 
of which we speak are not constructed linguistically. In the social 
world – the only world available to human beings, the world we al-
ways already inhabit – words and things are interdependent. The 
same mutually constitutive relationship exists between present con-
straints on human actions and future possibilities for them, between 
the free agent and the predetermined structure, between individual 
and society. When the starting point for human and social scientific 
investigations of meaning formation becomes constitutionist rather 
than constructivist, the traditional dichotomous foundations are 
abandoned. The division of the world into the given and the con-
structed and of utterances about worldly phenomena into categories 
of true and false are then replaced by a presupposition of interde-
pendency and an ideal of intersubjectivity. That is, our being in the 
world is simultaneously a fait accompli and an ongoing process of 
becoming, and our utterances about the world should not be judged 
on their objective truthfulness – as if we ever had access to the 
world independently of the utterance – but on its intersubjective 
meaningfulness.  
 
The focus of attention for constitutionist research is the question of 
how meaning arises in and through communication. Emphasis is 
placed on specific utterances and their relationships with other ut-
terances, the constitution of common understandings in communica-
tive networks. By focusing on communicative norms and expecta-
tions and the creative use of these to create new meanings in spe-
cific situations the constitutionist researcher seeks to explain how 
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the contexts in which we interact become stabilised while they re-
main changeable. The analytical practice of explaining the commu-
nicative constitution of meaning from within may be more difficult 
and less logically compelling than the deconstructive endeavour of 
taking peoples’ utterances apart. However, the constitutionist ap-
proach is truer to the utterances that it interprets, the phenomena 
with which the utterances relate, and the theoretical foundations on 
which it claims to be based than are constructivist analyses, which in 
practice rely on the positivistic dichotomies that are theoretically dis-
carded.  
 
Constitutionism offers an alternative to the constructivist starting 
point, which today informs most humanistic and social scientific 
studies of meaning formation. The constitutionist foundation enables 
the researcher to realise the explanatory potential that is inherent in 
constructivism’s theoretical recognition of the interrelationship be-
tween the world and our being in it. A potential that constructivism 
itself does not fulfil because it bases its analyses on dichotomous 
categories that are easy to handle, but disable the study and expla-
nation of interdependencies. The constitutionist perspective, then, 
closely resembles constructivism, but an important difference is in-
serted with the insistence of the both/and at the expense of the ei-
ther/or as the basic analytical tool. With the present paper we hope 
to have contributed to the ongoing debate about the benefits and 
limitations of (social) constructivism. We also hope to have pre-
sented the outline and basic argument for an alternative approach – 
constitutionism – that may spark new discussions. Many points in 
the constitutionist program need to be substantiated, and in particu-
lar the constitutionist mode of analysis must be detailed before the 
explanatory promise can even begin to be realised. However, we 
believe to have made a good start and are looking forward to con-
tinuing the conversation.   
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